The Dragon and The Eagle (Part III)

by Ambassador Thomas Graham (Retired) and David Bernell

(Note: It has been only a few days since the United States initiated an attack against Iran. We will be writing about this, but today we are posting the article we had completed just as that attack had begun.)

The Big Importance of a Little Island: The Gibraltar of Asia

The economic and military strengths of China are formidable. These are subjects we have addressed in two earlier articles. In addition to these tangible, material measures, it is also the case that the power and determination of China’s political leadership under President Xi Jinping is formidable. And when it comes to the political aims of Xi, the goal of reunifying Taiwan with the mainland – by force if necessary – sits at or near the top of his priorities. Considering Taiwan’s strong opposition to any such reunification, along with the increased measures it is taking to defend itself and ensure its sovereignty – and this includes a new $11 billion arms purchase from the United States – the potential for armed conflict seems to grow daily.

When one also considers the aversion of Taiwan’s allies and friends to see China forcefully take the island, and the stakes for global politics should China prove its capabilities by taking Taiwan – which would mean the neutralization or defeat of the United States military in the region – it is clear that the fate of Taiwan has significance far beyond the island itself.

For many decades the Rock of Gibraltar, sitting at the entrance of the often war-torn Mediterranean Sea, served as a symbol for the cause of the West’s security, due to its strategic location and the forces deployed there. This was abundantly true during World War II and the Cold War, as British and American forces used the location to keep hostile forces at bay. Now, as China has increasingly turned the balance of power in East Asia toward its favor, while eying the waters and islands of the South China Sea and the East China Sea as its own territories, Taiwan has been seen as the “Gibraltar of Asia,” a fortified strategic site at which democratic states who are aligned with one another seek to hold the line against authoritarian states who would diminish political freedom and usher in a new era of military conquest. The Gibraltar analogy offers interesting similarities to today, and it provides an excellent metaphor. However, Ukraine’s brave and successful resistance to Russia’s invasion is the comparison more readily offered since 2022, and it seems to serve as an equally relevant and probably more compelling example today. Either way, Taiwan is not only a site of political contestation. It is a signifier of the future of global politics, and it serves as a symbol to both the West and China, either as a site of resistance to China’s authoritarian designs, or an exemplar of China’s power and status should it achieve its aim of reunification.

The Curious Case of Taiwan

Taiwan’s importance derives from its unusual history. The island had been part of China’s Qing dynasty for two centuries, but it was taken by Japan in 1895 in the First Sino-Japanese War, in a period of Japanese modernization and military conquest. Taiwan became a colony of Japan, only to be returned to China after World War II as a consequence of Japan’s defeat in 1945. However, it was only controlled by China for a few years. The longstanding Chinese civil war, which spanned the years from 1927 to 1949 – with a period of unity between the Nationalists and the Communists during World War II to fight against Japan – led to a new status for the island. After the Nationalist party lost to the Communists in the civil war, Taiwan became the refuge of the Nationalists, who established themselves there in 1949.

Since then, the breakaway province has maintained its sovereignty in practice, but it has never declared its independence, in spite of the fact that it is, in effect, a separate, sovereign country. Rather, the governments of both China and Taiwan officially maintain that the two places together constitute a single country. At issue is simply which government is the legitimate government of all China, the Republic of China (as Taiwan is officially called), or the People’s Republic of China (China). For more than twenty years, Taiwan held that distinction around much of the world, and even held the Chinese seat at the United Nations. It was therefore one of the big five countries that had the right to veto any resolution before the UN Security Council. It was only in the 1970s that this UN seat was given to China, as more countries around the world recognized the government in Beijing as the legitimate representative of the country.

It is only the backing of the United States that has kept Taiwan from being retaken by China. It came under the protection of the U.S. as Communist China sided with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. That American presence and support has maintained the peace in the Taiwan Strait, even after the Cold War. As long as Taiwan did not declare independence (which would cause it to lose American support) and China didn’t try to take the island by force (which would also elicit American opposition), the peaceful status quo could be maintained with “one China, two systems.” And even when the United States formally recognized the government in Beijing in 1979 as the legitimate representative of China, it passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which committed the United States to upholding Taiwan’s status and providing it with armaments.

An important transformation took place in the 1980s that made the United States and Taiwan much closer. Under Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, who held power in Taiwan until his death in 1975, and then his son Chiang Ching-kuo, who succeeded him, the country existed under martial law as a military dictatorship that aligned politically with the West (technically there was a caretaker president for a few years after Chiang Kai-shek died, but Chiang’s son was the real power as both the Premier and head of the ruling political party). Over time, as the early generations left the scene, Taiwan ceased being simply a Cold War outpost. Instead, the military dictatorship became a functional democracy—a true democratic ally. This happened when Chiang Ching-kuo named a native Taiwanese as his vice-president. His name was Lee Teng-hui and upon the younger Chaing’s death in 1988, he succeeded to the presidency. Over the next few years, Lee carried out a number of democratic reforms, and in 1996 he ran for president in Taiwan’s first direct election of its leader. He won by a landslide, while another candidate representing a small, pro-independence party ran well behind in second place. The results demonstrated that the Taiwanese were eager for democracy and majority rule, but they were not interested in confronting Beijing with an attempt to assert independence. Since this time all of Taiwan’s leaders have been freely elected, and the democratization of Taiwan is comprehensive. This democratic legitimacy has further strengthened Taiwan’s claim to remain separate, if not formally independent, from China, while it also crystalizes the island’s important status – it is significant as both a linchpin and indicator of global politics.

War on the Horizon?

American backing and China’s inability to take the island by force have served the status quo for decades, but now China’s growing might and military capabilities, along with its openly stated objective of retaking Taiwan, is changing the equation. Taiwan’s resistance to Chinese designs, along with the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security, has made Taiwan an increasingly dangerous place. President Xi has declared that, “The reunification of the motherland is a historical inevitability.” In addition to saying that this future was unavoidable, Xi also said that “We make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means,” warning that China would permit “no external interference.” These are not one-time statements, but views that the president of China has repeatedly made for years, including most recently at the end of 2025, when Xi called reunification “unstoppable” and lauded the creation of an annual “Taiwan Recovery Day.”

This isn’t mere rhetoric. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have for several years conducted military drills simulating an attack on Taiwan. They have repeatedly launched missiles into the Taiwan Strait and conducted live-fire exercises near Taiwan. Its planes and ships often cross the median line – the unofficial border in the Strait. Most recently, in response to the decision of the United Staes last December to sell $11 billion in advanced weaponry to Taiwan (the largest such sale ever of U.S. weapons to Taiwan), China held a major live-fire drill around Taiwan as a “stern warning” against “separatist forces and external interference,” meaning the government of Taiwan and the United States. Involved in this drill were elements of the army, navy, air force, and rocket forces. It established a mock blockade of Taiwan’s key ports, featuring simulated attacks by 22 naval ships and more than 130 military aircraft. A Chinese spokesman said that, “The drills are a punitive and deterrent action against separatist forces who seek Taiwan independence through military buildup…anyone who tries to arm Taiwan to contain China will only embolden the reformists and push the Taiwan Strait closer to the peril of armed conflict.”

Further confirming the objectives of the military exercises China routinely conducts around Taiwan are American intelligence assessments which find that China’s President has called on the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. In 2021, the head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Phil Davidson, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that China’s behavior in the region led him to believe that the threat to Taiwan is more imminent than previously believed, and that China is readying its military capability to make a move against Taiwan by 2027. Two years later, CIA Director Bill Burns said that intelligence showed Xi Jinping had “instructed the People’s Liberation Army to be ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion.”

Both China’s capabilities and its stated intentions indicate that military conflict is increasingly possible in the region, and could even happen as soon as next year. War in the region would represent a major threat not only to the interests of Taiwan, but also Japan and South Korea, as well as the United States.

In 1958 there was a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, when China fired artillery at the Taiwan-controlled islands of Quemoy and Matsu in an attempt to reclaim them. At that time China’s conventional military was much weaker than it is today. Nor was the country in possession of nuclear weapons. U.S. military planners were unsure even then whether China could be deterred by conventional means alone. The risk of a far worse crisis today has escalated well beyond that stage, including the dangers of potential escalation to a nuclear level. And once again, American planners are not confident they can deter Chinese military action.

Is The United States Ready and Able?

Taiwan hopes and expects that, most importantly, the United States, and also its friends in Asia and elsewhere would come to its defense in the event of an invasion. However, American policy and its level of support is less certain with the presence of Donald Trump in the White House. American foreign policy currently reflects Trump’s seeming admiration for strongmen and dictators, a preference for the establishment of regional spheres of influence as evidenced by the administration’s National Security Strategy and the American military operation to remove the Venezuelan president from office, and Trump’s lack of enthusiasm for aligning with fellow democracies and allies. None of these things provide high levels of assurance that Trump would act to defend a friendly democracy in Taiwan against an authoritarian government acting in its own part of the world where it is establishing greater regional power and influence.

On top if this, even if the United States were to aid Taiwan in the event of war, it is not clear what the outcome of any such conflict would be. The American military is well aware of China’s growing military presence and capabilities around Taiwan. It is also cognizant of the fact that China’s military deployments and posture are designed with the United States in mind, such that the PLA can take advantage of its strengths and exploit American vulnerabilities. The Pentagon has tested these respective capabilities in repeated war game exercises and assessed them in a report that has been called “The Overmatch Brief.” The New York Times obtained a copy of the report and noted that, “it catalogs China’s ability to destroy American fighter planes, large ships and satellites, and identifies the U.S. military’s supply chain choke points.” The report says that the news is not good for the United States: “the picture it paints is disturbing….we lose every time.”

One must also remember that China’s abilities and preparation for conflict extend beyond traditional military power. State-sponsored hacking operations have been found to infiltrate New York’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the Port of Houston, the water system of Littleton, Massachusetts, and many other critical infrastructure networks in the communications, energy, transportation, water, and government sectors in the United States. While the hacking operations that were recently discovered didn’t do any direct harm, it is believed that such operations are test runs, or pre-positioned malware for potential future attacks to “wage war against entire systems, attacking the connective tissue that allows an adversary to communicate, move, decide, and recover,” and even “paralyze an adversary before combat begins.”

It would not be unreasonable to think that the United States is not up to the challenge that China could pose to it. There has been a longstanding realization in the United States across multiple administrations and both political parties that China’s industrial abilities are massive and in many cases surpass the United States. There is also a keen awareness that these strengths have military and security implications. At the same time, in light of how serious American official say the challenge is, the U.S. response has been relatively weak and inconsistent, with varying tariffs, partial export controls, an occasional Trump-induced trade war, and scattershot industrial policy over the past several years. These do not seem like well-coordinated, effective responses to protect vital interests or respond to a serious international power. Such actions may reflect a recognition that United States is getting outmatched, but will they really accomplish all that much?

In addition, the leadership of Donald Trump, along with the person he put in charge at the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, does not inspire confidence. Trump’s scattered attention and frequent foreign policy reversals, along with Hegseth’s poor leadership, incompetence, and focus on “manliness” and DEI, can easily lead to the assessment – both at home and abroad – that America’s political readiness to meet a serious challenge, or at worst a war, is at best questionable.

Avoiding the Worst-Case Scenario

The awareness of major risks is the first step toward avoiding them. Conflict is not inevitable and stability is possible. Moreover, in the post-World War II era, nuclear war has been unthinkable between countries with nuclear weapons. As bilateral relations seem to deteriorate, there are also growing calls for stepping back from the brink of conflict. One article, co-authored by Chinese and American analysts, offers a pathway toward a more peaceful, less confrontational relationship. Another goes further and calls for a “grand bargain” that would allow for “peaceful coexistence and productive power sharing.” It argues that such a deal could ensure China’s continued access to American markets, capital, technology, and institutions of higher education and research, which are key to sustaining its economic growth. The United States would keep its access to China’s expanding market, hard-to-replace supply chains, critical minerals, and investment capital. The “bargain” would also involve an understanding on Taiwan to ease tensions and a recognition that both countries will shoulder a more shared arrangement of international responsibilities.

The extent to which the leadership of either China or the United States wishes to embrace such calls is uncertain. In their public statements, the leaders of both countries express a desire to win any confrontation. However, countries cannot “win” relationships, they have to live in them and manage them. So the objective must be to manage the relationship, mitigating dangers while encouraging cooperation where possible, all while building strengths that both countries will have to mutually respect (and fear).

With this in mind, the United States should not be self-deterred from continuing its support for Taiwan. After all, there are important reasons for Chinese restraint. Taipei and Beijing have significant economic ties, and an all-out invasion of Taiwan would be an extremely costly undertaking in terms of blood and treasure. That Taiwan is the home of TSMC, the maker of 90 percent of the world’s advanced semiconductor chips, could be a lure for China, but if TSMC’s operations are disrupted by a military campaign, the Chinese economy could be hurt in significant ways. China might want a future unification with Taiwan, but perhaps not at a cost of a major war and economic disruption.

In a context where the United States seems less than ready at present to fully compete with China in terms of industrial output or military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait, building capacity while avoiding direct military confrontation is the responsible option. Moreover, strengthening one’s position while providing strong and clear American support for Taiwan does more than protect a fellow democracy and economic giant while containing unwelcome Chinese designs on the island, it also buttresses a stronghold of liberalism against rising illiberal tides.

Taiwan faces the largest dictatorship in the world just 80 miles away, a government that has demonstrated, in Hong Kong, its willingness and ability to quash any expression of freedom. For America not to stand with the Taiwanese in a time of crisis – after more than 70 years of close partnership, after Taiwan transitioned from a military dictatorship into a vigorous liberal democratic state – and watch China’s armed forces march into Taiwan would be a strategic as well as moral failure of the highest order.