The Greatest Possible Danger and Hazard

by Ambassador Thomas Graham (Retired) and David Bernell

The words and actions of Donald Trump and his administration are making the United States and the world less secure. Trump is making the spread of nuclear weapons much more likely, and threatening the end of a worldwide nuclear nonproliferation system that that United States has led and championed for decades. The success in keeping almost every country in the world free of nuclear weapons has been a remarkable achievement. But now the United States itself threatens that achievement.

Early in the nuclear age, before the development of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, their acquisition was considered a normal act of upgrading a nation’s military. Nuclear weapons were viewed by many as simply the most recent modern weapon. By 1960 four countries – the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union – had nuclear weapons included as part of their national arsenals. China became the fifth nuclear weapon state in 1964. India and Israel were also known at the time to be actively seeking nuclear weapons, and Sweden and Switzerland were considering them as an option for their own defense. A reasonable assumption was that the development and deployment of nuclear weapons would become widespread and normalized over time.

President John F. Kennedy did not share these views. He believed, like others, that nuclear weapons would sweep across the world, but he feared this possibility and did not want to see such deployments become the norm. Responding to a reporter’s question in 1963, he thought that by 1970 there would be ten nuclear weapon states, and that by 1975 the number could increase to as many as twenty-five. He said he regarded this as “the greatest possible danger and hazard.”

Kennedy’s darkest fears were not realized. Instead, countries agreed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into force in 1970. This treaty is centered on a simple bargain: countries that agree to forego building nuclear weapons would receive assistance and cooperation from the five nuclear weapon states – the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China – for peaceful nuclear uses such as reactors for power plants and nuclear medical equipment. Meanwhile, the five NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states would have a goal at some unspecified time of getting rid of their nuclear weapons. As of 2025, there are 191 signatories to the NPT, and only four additional countries have ever developed nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. The nuclear weapons programs of these four countries exist outside the NPT and they are not members of the treaty.

Keeping the Peace with Good Policy and Good Luck

During the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the United States provided what has been called “extended deterrence” or a “nuclear umbrella” to their allies. Deterrence, which produced a circumstance of “mutually assured destruction” (the acronym MAD was no accident), along with the NPT, kept the nuclear peace and limited the proliferation of nuclear weapons. After the Cold War, the United States and Russia greatly reduced the size of their nuclear arsenals, and while the Warsaw Pact was disbanded, the U.S. has maintained a policy of extended deterrence. Since Russia invaded Ukraine, this has proven to be very reassuring to the members of NATO, particularly Poland and the Baltic States. Not only have they known in their history what Russian domination means for them, they would also be the next likely targets of a strengthened and emboldened Russia should it emerge successful in Ukraine. To date, deterrence and the NPT have continued to inhibit nuclear proliferation and keep the nuclear peace.

The policy of the United States for decades has been in support of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. Since 1945 a long string of presidents starting with Harry Truman put preventing nuclear war and controlling the spread of nuclear weapons at the top of their agendas. (Trump in his first term didn’t do much to support this agenda, but he didn’t do much to diminish it either.) The logic has been simple: if more states have nuclear weapons it increases the chances of their use at some point. Members of the NPT agree with this logic, and countries all over the world participate in a system of inspections of nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure uses remain peaceful and that nuclear materials are accounted for. There is also widespread participation in an organization called the Nuclear Suppliers Group to ensure that exports of sensitive technologies that could potentially be used to manufacture nuclear weapons are monitored and tracked to ensure peaceful uses. The value and considerable success of this whole nonproliferation system led to the permanent extension of the NPT when it was due to expire in 1995. (Note by David: I would like to call out the key role that my friend and coauthor Ambassador Tom Graham played for the United States in securing the permanent extension of the NPT, serving as President Clinton’s Special Representative for Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament. For more information about Tom’s work, go here.)

The array of arms control treaties, international agencies, export controls, inspectors, defense policies, alliances, and painstaking work by people all over the world has been effective in maintaining a measure of nuclear security. At the same time, however, the world has also been lucky to avoid a nuclear catastrophe. One several occasions since 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia came frighteningly close to general nuclear war, beginning with the well-known Cuban Missile Crisis. One such close call occurred in November of 1979 when an American defense radar system reported a massive Soviet missile attack was on the way to the U.S. in the middle of the night. There was no Soviet attack, but before this was confirmed, American nuclear bombers and Strategic Air Command were preparing to retaliate. A few years later in 1983, Soviet radar misread sunlight reflecting off a satellite as an American strategic attack. The Soviet officer on duty at the early warning command center kept his head and decided that what he was seeing was a computer error. Instead of notifying his superiors, which might have begun the process of launching Soviet missiles at the United States, he waited for conclusive evidence and confirmed there was no attack coming.

Even after the Cold War, in 1995 – and fortunately not too long after Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin had met in person and had lunch together – a Russian defense radar misread the launch of a rocket from Norway to conduct scientific tests in the atmosphere. The Russians, along with many other states, had been notified well in advance, but the information had not been passed along to the Russian military, who interpreted the signal as a U.S. strategic missile attack aimed at Moscow. Russia went on full nuclear alert, but Yeltsin didn’t order a retaliatory attack. He knew Clinton and believed him to be a rational person.

During those truly terrifying incidents, the two sides came within just a few minutes of all out nuclear war, and these instances were but a few of the many close calls that have occurred. If there are more nuclear weapon states, this will mean more opportunities for close calls, false alarms, and accidents. The problem is not just theoretical. Other states have at some point seriously considered, pursued, or built a nuclear weapon stockpile, including Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Australia, and South Africa. South Africa actually built six nuclear weapons, with one more under construction shortly before Nelson Mandela became president. Outgoing president F.W. de Klerk had the weapons eliminated and the country joined the NPT.

From Bad to Worse

Nuclear weapons remain a great danger. There are still over 12,000 of them in the world. But in 2025 the United States is making the situation even worse. With Trump’s return to the White House, and his ongoing efforts to upend American government, politics, and both domestic and foreign policy (and to punish anyone he sees as an enemy), he seems determined to match the first 100 days of activity made famous by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933. But as David Remnick said in The New Yorker, “While Roosevelt set a modern standard for the revitalization of a society, Trump seems determined to prove how quickly he can spark its undoing. In record time, he has brought shame and disorder to the country.”

With respect to foreign policy, President Trump is giving clear indications to America’s NATO allies that the United States can no longer be counted on to come to their defense. Longstanding friends and allies of the United States have taken Trump’s public comments, social media posts, and administration policies very seriously, and they are coming to the conclusion that they cannot continue to rely on the United States.

There is now a growing conversation among America’s NATO allies – including public comments by government officials, analyses by defense experts, and articles from media outlets – that they will have to bolster their own defenses and protect their security themselves. More ominously, the topic has been raised that a number of countries who had relied on United States defense guarantees may want to cross the nuclear weapon threshold and develop their own arsenals, or gain access to extended deterrence from a French nuclear umbrella. These countries include Germany, Poland, and the Baltic States in Europe, and could include many other NATO members. None of these countries have made any decisions or firm commitments, but the conversation has begun. Considering that Trump entered office only ten weeks ago, this turnabout has been astonishing. How can this be happening?

The actions of Trump and his team – including Vice President J.D. Vance, Elon Musk, and others in the administration – are remaking the American relationship with both friends and adversaries. They have denigrated and criticized fellow NATO members’ defense policies, foreign policies, and even their commitment to democracy. They have berated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office and temporarily cutoff US military aid and intelligence to Ukraine. They have said that the U.S. wants to take Greenland from NATO ally Denmark. They have imposed tariffs on America’s biggest trading partners. The United States voted with Russia and North Korea against a UN resolution condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, Trump has repeatedly expressed his admiration for Vladimir Putin, and before returning to office, he said that Russia could “do whatever the hell they want” to NATO members if they didn’t “pay up” (Trump has repeatedly mischaracterized the commitment among NATO members to increase their defense spending as a failure to pay the United States for its defense guarantees to NATO countries).

One example along similar lines that is less well-known involves the U.S. considering giving up the NATO Supreme Allied Commander position, which it has held since the beginning of NATO with General Dwight Eisenhower. Retired Admiral James Stavridis, who served in this position from 2009-2013, said that doing so would not only “be a political mistake of epic proportion” that would cause the United States to “lose an enormous amount of influence within NATO.” Such an action also “would be seen, correctly, as probably the first step toward leaving the alliance altogether.” Considering also that Trump said in his first term that he wanted to withdraw from NATO, and has repeatedly said, including less than one month ago, that “If they [NATO members] don’t pay, I’m not going to defend them,” the United States appears to its allies that it is ready – and maybe even preparing – to walk away from the core tenet of the alliance, and maybe even withdraw from NATO altogether.

The result of all these words and deeds has been that the United States, the long-term guarantor of security for NATO members via its nuclear umbrella and conventional military capabilities, is now rapidly losing its credibility as a reliable ally. NATO members (and Ukraine too) are losing trust in the United States and are beginning to look for security support from somewhere else.

A Break With Europe?

The United States’ relationship with Germany is particularly important, and the two countries have been close allies for decades. Since World War II, Germany has not built a large military force, and has had very limited military engagement abroad, providing troops and weapons beyond its borders only under certain specified conditions. It has largely relied on the United States and NATO for its defense, though the Russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted greater defense spending, along with the provision of weapons to Ukraine to defend itself.

Now, after dealing with the Trump administration over the past few months, Germany is distancing itself from the United States. When Vice President J.D. Vance showed up in February for the annual Munich Security Conference, he gave a speech chastising the German government for being undemocratic by maintaining its “firewall” against the inclusion of the extremist AfD party in governing coalitions. AfD is a far-right, anti-immigrant, xenophobic party that says Germany should stop being so concerned with its Nazi past. (Vance also met with the leader of AfD when he was in Germany, and Elon Musk gave his endorsement to the party in the recent German elections.) The German government is adamant about holding the line against extremism. Its leaders take the phrase “never again” seriously. By encouraging the country to look positively toward the potential return of the Nazis, Vance ensured a serious rupture between Germany and the U.S. In response, incoming German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said that it would be "his absolute priority" to build up strong European defenses as quickly as possible and "achieve independence from the USA."

One part of meeting this priority could involve “nuclear sharing” with France and Britain to allow for a nuclear deterrent closer to home. While Merz has made clear that Germany "cannot and must not have its own nuclear weapons," saying that the country has "expressly renounced the possession of nuclear weapons, and that will remain the case," he has also suggested that French and British nuclear forces could play a role in guaranteeing European security. This is something that French President Macron has indicated he is willing to discuss.

Much in the same vein, the government of Poland has also raised the topic of providing more for its own defense, including the possibility of nuclear weapons. Poland suffered greatly in World War II and during the Cold War at the hands of the Soviet Union. It knows firsthand the potential of Russian power, it sees Russia’s violence against Ukraine, and it sees itself as a potential future target of Putin’s Russia. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, in a speech to Poland’s parliament in March, said that the country will expand its military to 500,000 soldiers and ensure that it provides military training every man in the country, along with a considerable increase in conventional arms. He also said that “Poland must reach for the most modern capabilities also related to nuclear weapons...this is a race for security, not for war," He also said that he is “talking seriously” with France about being protected by French nuclear weapons. Other states will be likely to have an interest in such an arrangement, such as the Baltic states, Finland and Sweden, and perhaps Italy and Spain or Eastern European states once part of the Warsaw Pact.

Trying to put a good face on the rapidly deteriorating state of U.S.-European relations, EU president Ursula von der Leyen has commented that while the U.S. could still be described as an ally, she noted that it is not considered to be a “like-minded” country. Accordingly, the British and French have suggested a peacekeeping force to be deployed in Ukraine to ensure Russia stays out of Ukraine after a truce or peace agreement is signed. The British held two summit meetings with NATO allies and the EU to discuss this, but the U.S. did not come to either meeting, and it is not being invited to participate. The envisioned peacekeeping force of 10,000 soldiers to be deployed in Ukraine would not include any Americans.

Macron and other European leaders are looking well beyond the short term. There is a realization that a massive amount of funding is going to be necessary to build up European military forces, and that these will be essential for protecting European security, keeping Russia at bay, and providing peacekeepers for Ukraine. In addition, Macron has urged that NATO countries making purchases for their militaries avoid relying heavily on weapons purchases from the United States, and should instead buy their equipment from France. This is because of doubts about American support for Europe in the future.

It does not take a large leap to think that some of the equipment France could provide to others could include assistance for European states that want an independent, sovereign nuclear weapon deterrent. France did that for Israel in the 1950s, selling to Israel a plutonium-producing reactor and a reprocessing facility. The remaining piece of the deal, the heavy water, was sold to Israel by Norway. If France could do this for Israel in the 1950s, it could certainly do the same for its European allies in the 2020s.

What About Everywhere Else?

Beyond Europe, there are countries in the Asia Pacific region that are considering their own nuclear deterrent, particularly South Korea. One analyst, quoted in an article entitled “Why South Korea Wants Nuclear Weapons Now More Than Ever,” stated that “mistrust of the U.S. is growing” and that “the reelection of Trump is an opportunity for South Korea to create its own nuclear weapons.” Another analysis suggested that South Korea’s interest in nuclear weapons “will be significantly affected by how the Trump administration approaches the alliance with South Korea.” Trump has (as expected) called on South Korea to “pay more” for American troops stationed in the country, and this further diminishes confidence in the security guarantee the U.S. provides.

Once the “nuclear taboo” is broken due to a loss of faith in the United States, it makes additional nuclear proliferation more likely. Other candidates could be Japan and Australia, and the place with the most pressing serious security concern in the region, Taiwan. China has been hinting in recent years that it might invade Taiwan, and it harasses the island daily with bomber flybys and warship encroachment. It launches missiles into the Taiwan Strait and conducts military drills to encircle the country. Chinese President Xi Jinping says that China can achieve unification with Taiwan “without a doubt,” and that reunification is inevitable. The confrontation is increasingly treacherous.

Simple nuclear weapons are not challenging to build if the fissile material is available. There are countries in every region of the world have the technology and the skills to design and build them, and to manufacture or acquire plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Once a country, or a handful of countries, goes down this path, the incentives for other countries to follow will become greater. Several states could create their own nuclear deterrent, or seek protection via another country’s extended deterrence.

The policy of the United States with regard to nuclear nonproliferation has been based for decades on the idea that the spread of nuclear weapons to more and more countries makes everyone less safe. The reason there has not been widespread threatening of world peace with nuclear weapons is because there have been treaties and security organizations such as the NPT, NATO, American defense treaties with Japan and South Korea, and other security measures that make it impractical and unwise for all but a few countries in the world.

Now, however, the United States government is engaged in such egregious acts of political and military recklessness, it is risking the possibility that nuclear weapons could spread widely, even well beyond NATO. The damage being done by the Trump administration to American and global security is massive. Trump is causing countries to reassess their own relationship with the United States and reconsider their own military forces, and this might include the development of nuclear weapons. The American nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence achieved the multiple goals of providing security to the United States and its allies (and many other countries), while limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and the dangers inherent in widespread nuclear deployments. Walking away from this success and inviting nuclear proliferation is dangerous folly. It is strategic and political malpractice of the highest possible level.